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Abstract
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power
restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature
of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and
does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in
one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can
be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes-Nash incentive-
compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational, and
efficient. To address this negative result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that is
incentive-compatible and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions,
and produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments. The
mechanism is based on a single-offer bargaining and we show that a randomized multi-offer
extension brings no additional benefit.
1 Introduction
When modeling economic interactions between agents, it is standard to adopt a general framework
where payoffs of individuals are dependent on the actions of all other decision-makers. However,
some agents may have payoffs that depend only on their own actions, not on actions taken by
other agents. In this paper, we explore the consequences of such asymmetries among agents. Since
these features lead to a restricted version of the general model, the hope is that we can identify
mechanisms that produce efficient outcomes by exploiting the properties of this specific setting.
A classic application of this setting is Coase’s example of a polluter and a single victim, e.g., a
steel mill that affects a laundry. The Coase theorem (1960) is often interpreted as a demonstration
of why private negotiations between polluters and victims can yield efficient levels of pollution
without government interference. However, in an influential article, Hahnel and Sheeran (2009)
criticize the Coase theorem by showing that, under more realistic conditions, it is unlikely that
an efficient outcome will be reached. They emphasize that the solution is a negotiation, and
not a market-based transaction as described by Coase. As such, incomplete information plays an
important role and game theory and bargaining games can explain inefficient outcomes.
Other real-life applications are found in large-scale restoration of interdependent infrastructures
after significant disruptions [Cavdaroglu et al., 2013; Coffrin et al., 2012], humanitarian logistics
∗An earlier, shorter version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International joint con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2015.
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over multiple states or regions [Van Hentenryck et al., 2010], supply chain coordination (see, e.g.,
Voigt (2011)), integrated logistics, and the joint planning and the control of gas and electricity
networks. Consider for example the restoration of the power system and the telecommunication
network after a major disaster. As explained in Cavdaroglu et al. [2013], there are one-way depen-
dencies between the power system and the telecommunication network. This means, for instance,
that some power lines must be restored before some parts of the telecommunication network become
available. It is possible to use centralized mechanisms for restoring the system as a whole. However,
it is often the case that these restorations are performed by different agencies with independent
objectives and selfish behavior may have a strong impact on the social welfare. It is thus impor-
tant to study whether it is possible to find high-quality outcomes in decentralized settings when
stakeholders proceed independently and do not share complete information about their utilities.
This paper aims at taking a first step in this direction by proposing a class of two players one-
way dependent decision settings which abstracts some of the salient features of these applications
and formalizes many of Hahnel and Sheeran’s critiques. We present a number of negative and
positive results on one-way games. We first show that Nash equilibria in one-way games, under
no side payments, can be arbitrarily far from the optimal social welfare. Moreover, in contrast to
Coase theorem, we show that when side payments are allowed in a Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible
setting, there is no ex-post efficient individually rational, and budget-balanced mechanism for one-
way games. To address this negative result, we focus on mechanisms that are budget-balanced,
individually rational, incentive-compatible that are relatively efficient. Our main positive result is
a single-offer bargaining mechanism which under reasonable assumptions on the players, increases
the social welfare compared to the setting where no side payments are allowed. We also show that
this single-offer mechanism cannot be improved by a (randomized) multi-offer mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define one-way games and study
the properties of Nash equilibria. In section 4.1 we prove an impossibility result. The single offer
mechanism is presented and analyzed in sections 5 and 5.1 respectively. Finally, in section 6 we
present a multi-offer mechanism and we show that it doesn’t improve the efficiency with respect to
the single-offer one.
2 One-Way Games
One-way games feature two players A and B. Each player i ∈ A,B has a public action set Si
and we write S = SA × SB to denote the set of joint action profiles. As most commonly done in
mechanism design, we model private information by associating each agent i with a payoff function
ui : S ×Θi → R+, where ui(s, θi) is the agent utility for strategy profile s when the agent has type
θi. We assume that the player types are stochastically independent and drawn from a distribution f
that is common knowledge. We denote by Θi the possible types of player i and write Θ = ΘA×ΘB.
If θ ∈ Θ, we use θi to denote the type of player i in θ. Similar conventions are used for strategies,
utilities, and type distributions.
A key feature of one-way games is that the payoff uA((sA, sB), θA) of player A is determined
only by her own strategy and does not depend on B’s actions, i.e.,
∀sA, sB , s′B , θA : uA((sA, sB), θA) = uA((sA, s′B), θA).
As a result, for ease of notation, we use uA(sA, θA) to denote A’s payoff. Obviously, player B must
act according to what player A chooses to do and we use sB(sA, θB) to denote the best response of
player B given that A plays action sA and player B has type θB , i.e.,
sB(sA, θB) = arg-max
sB∈SB
uB((sA, sB), θB)
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where ties are broken arbitrarily. In this paper, we always assume that ties are broken arbitrarily
in arg-max expressions.
One-way games assumes that players are risk-neutral agents and that after having observed the
realization of their own types, players simultaneously choose their actions. As a consequence, if
side payments are not allowed, player A will play an action sNA that yields her a maximum payoff,
i.e.,
sNA (θA) = arg-max
sA∈SA
uA(sA, θA),
Player B will pick sNB (θB) such that her expected payoff is maximized, i.e.,
sNB (θB) = arg-max
sB∈SB
EθA
[
uB(sB(s
N
A (θA), θB), θB)
]
.
The set of Nash equilibria (NE) is thus characterized by sN (θ) = (sNA (θA), s
N
B (θB)) ⊆ S. The
best response sNB (θB) of player B may be a bad outcome for her even when B has a much greater
potential payoff. Player A achieves its optimal payoff, but our motivating applications aim at
optimizing a global welfare function
SW ((sA, sB), θ) = uA(sA, θA) + uB((sA, sB), θB).
Thus, the global welfare achieved by the Nash equilibria can be expressed as SW (sN (θ), θ). We
quantify the quality of the Nash equilibrium outcome with the price of anarchy (PoA).
Definition 1. The price of anarchy of sN (θ) ⊆ S given type θ ∈ Θ is defined as
PoA(θ) =
maxs∈S SW (s, θ)
mins∈sN (θ) SW (s, θ)
.
A natural extension for the price of anarchy is to quantify the expected worst-case equilibrium.
Definition 2. The Bayes-Nash price of anarchy is defined as
PoA = Eθ [PoA(θ)] .
Note that the price of anarchy given type θ ∈ Θ can be used to obtain a lower and an upper bound
on the Bayes-Nash price of anarchy in the following way,
min
θ∈Θ
PoA(θ) ≤ PoA ≤ max
θ∈Θ
PoA(θ).
Throughout this paper, we use the following two running examples to illustrate key concepts.
Example 1. Consider the instance where player A has two possible actions s1A, s
2
A ∈ SA. Action
s1A has a payoff uA(s
1
A) distributed according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 100, while
action s2A has a constant payoff uA(s
2
A) = 100. The set of dominant actions for player B corresponds
to the set of best responses sB(s
1
A) and sB(s
2
A). Let player B have only one type and we set payoffs
to be uB(sB(s
1
A)) = x and uB(sB(s
2
A)) = 0, where x is a positive constant. When no transfers are
allowed, player A will always play action s2A, yielding a social welfare of 100 + 0. If player A plays
s1A, her expected payoff is 50 and the expected social welfare is thus 50 + x. The price of anarchy
is 50+x100 if x ≥ 50 and 1 otherwise. Notice that the PoA is an increasing function of x.
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Example 2. Consider the instance where player A has n possible actions s1A, s
2
A, . . . , s
n
A ∈ SA.
Each action has a payoff uA(s
i
A) which is independent and identically distributed according to
a Uniform distribution between 0 and 1. For player B, consider the set of best responses
sB(s
1
A, θB), sB(s
2
A, θB), . . . , sB(s
n
A, θB). Let the expected payoffs be EθB
[
uB(sB(s
i
A, θB), θB)
]
= µi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µn. All other payoffs are set to 0, i.e., for any θB ∈ ΘB ,
sA ∈ SA and sB 6= sB(sA, θB): uB ((sB, sA), θB) = 0.
When no transfers are allowed, player A chooses her (realized) maximizing payoff action. Such
action is distributed according to the largest order statistic, i.e., the maximum between all payoffs.
The largest order statistic between n standard Uniforms follows a Beta(n, 1) distribution, with
mean n
n+1 . Hence, the expected payoff of player A is
n
n+1 .
By symmetry of player A’s payoff functions, all her actions will be played with probability 1
n
.
Thus, player B’s expected payoff is maximized when choosing sB(s
1
A, θB), yielding her an expected
payoff of µ1
n
. As a result, the expected social welfare in equilibrium is n
n+1 +
µ1
n
.
To compute the optimal social welfare note that if player A select s1A with probability 1, her
expected payoff is 12 and the expected payoff of player B is µ1 and so the social welfare is
1
2 + µ1,
which is greater than n
n+1 +
µ1
n
if µ1 ≥ 12 . The price of anarchy is
(
1
2 + µ1
)
/
(
n
n+1 +
µ1
n
)
, and in
the limit as n→∞, the PoA becomes 12 +µ1. Notice that the PoA is an increasing function of µ1.
Examples 1 and 2 illustrates that, when no transfers are allowed, the price of anarchy can be
arbitrarily large as player B ’s payoff is large compare with the payoff of player A. We now
generalize this idea to quantify the price of anarchy in one-way games.
Proposition 1. In one-way games, the price of anarchy when no payments are allowed satisfies,
for any type θ,
maxs∈S uB(s, θB)
maxs∈S uA(s, θA) + uB(sN (θ), θB)
≤ PoA(θ) ≤ 1 + maxs∈S uB(s, θB)
maxs∈S uA(s, θA)
,
Proof. Let ui(θi) = maxs∈S ui(s, θi), i ∈ {A,B}. Independence of player A implies that, for all
θ ∈ Θ, her payoff is uA(sN (θ), θA) = uA(θA). It follows that
max{uA(θA), uB(θB)}
uA(θA) + uB(sN (θ), θB)
≤ PoA(θ)
≤ uA(θA) + uB(θB)
uA(θA) + uB(sN (θ), θB)
≤ uA(θA) + uB(θB)
uA(θA)
= 1 +
uB(θB)
uA(θA)
.
The price of anarchy can thus be arbitrarily large. When it is large enough, Proposition 1 indicates
that maxs∈S uB(s, θB) ≥ maxs∈S uA(s, θA) ≥ uB(sN (θ), θB). In this case, player B has bargaining
power to incentivize player A monetarily so that she moves from her equilibrium and cooperates to
overcome a bad social welfare. This paper explores this possibility by analyzing the social welfare
when side payments are allowed.
3 Related Work
Before moving to the main results, it is useful to discuss related games. One-way games may seem to
resemble Stackelberg games with their notions of leader and follower. The key difference however is
that, in one-way games, the leader does not depend on the action taken by the follower. In addition,
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in one-way games, players do not have complete information and moves are simultaneous. Jackson
and Wilkie (2005) studied one-way instances derived from their more general framework of endoge-
nous games. However, they tackled the problem from a different perspective and assumed complete
information (i.e., the player utilities are not private). Jackson and Wilkie gave a characterization
of the outcome when players make binding offers of side payments, deriving the conditions under
which a new outcome becomes a Nash equilibrium or remains one. They analyzed a subclass, called
’one sided externality’, which is essentially a one-way game but with complete information. They
showed that the efficient outcome is an equilibrium in this setting, supporting Coase’s claim that
a polluter and his victim can reach an efficient outcome. Under perfect information, the victim
can determine the minimal transfer necessary to support the efficient play. Naturally, this result
does not hold under incomplete information [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983]. In what follows,
we design a bargaining mechanism that is able to cope with the incomplete information setting.
4 Bayesian-Nash Mechanisms
In this section, we consider a Bayesian-Nash setting with quasi-linear preferences. Both players A
and B have private utilities and beliefs about the utilities of the other players. By the revelation
principle, we can restrict our attention to direct mechanisms which implement a social choice
function. A social choice function in quasi-linear environments takes the form of f(θ) = (k(θ), t(θ))
where, for every θ ∈ Θ, k(θ) ∈ S is the allocation function and ti(θ) ∈ R represents a monetary
transfer to agent i. The main objective of mechanism design is to implement a social choice function
that achieves near efficient allocations while respecting some desirable properties. For completeness,
we specify these key properties.
Definition 3. A social choice function is ex-post efficient if, for all θ ∈ Θ, we have k(θ) ∈
arg-maxs∈S
∑
i ui(s, θ).
Definition 4. A social choice function is budget-balanced (BB) if, for all θ ∈ Θ, we have∑i ti(θ) =
0.
In other words, there are no net transfers out of the system or into the system. Taken together,
ex-post efficiency and budget-balance imply Pareto optimality. An essential condition of any mech-
anism is to guarantee that agents report their true types. The following property captures this
notion when agents have prior beliefs on the types of other agents.
Definition 5. A social choice function is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible (IC) if for every player
i:
Eθ−i|θi [ui(k(θi, θ−i), θi) + ti(θi, θ−i)] ≥ Eθ−i|θi
[
ui(k(θˆi, θi), θi) + ti(θˆi, θ−i)
]
where θi ∈ Θi is the type of player i, θˆi is the type player i reports, and Eθ−i|θi denotes player i’s
expectation over prior beliefs θ−i of the types of other agents given her own type θi.
The most natural definition of individual-rationality (IR) is interim IR, which states that every
agent type has non-negative expected gains from participation.
Definition 6. A social choice function is interim individual-rational if, for all types θ ∈ Θ, it
satisfies
Eθ−i|θi [ui(k(θ), θi) + ti(θ)] ≥ ui(θi),
where ui(θi) is the expected utility for non-participation.
5
In the context of one-way games, both players have positive outside options that depend only
in their types. In particular, the outside options are given by the Nash equilibrium outcome
under no side payments. For players A and B, the expected utilities for non-participation are
uA(θA) = uA(s
N
A (θA), θA) and uB(θB) = uB(s
N (θ), θB) respectively.
4.1 Impossibility Result
This section shows that there exists no mechanism for one-way games that is efficient and satisfies
the traditional desirable properties. The result is derived from the Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983)
theorem, a seminal impossibility result in mechanism design. The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem
considers a bargaining game with two-sided private information and it states that, for a bilateral
trade setting, there exists no Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism that is budget balanced,
ex-post efficient, and gives every agent type non-negative expected gains from participation (i.e.,
ex interim individual rationality).
Our contribution is twofold: we present an impossibility result for one-way games and we relate
them with bargaining games, an idea that we will further explore on the following sections. We
now formalize the impossibility result for one-way games.
Consider the Myerson-Satterthwaite bilateral bargaining setting.
Definition 7. Myerson-Satterthwaite bargaining game:
1. A seller (player 1) owns an object for which her valuation is v1 ∈ V1, and a buyer (player 2)
wants to buy the object at a valuation v2 ∈ V2.
2. Each player i knows her valuation vi at the time of the bargaining and player 1 (resp. 2) has
a probability density distribution f2(v2) (resp. f1(v1)) for the other player’s valuation.
3. Both distributions are assumed to be continuous and positive on their domain, and the inter-
section of the domains is not empty.
By the revelation principle, we can restrict our attention to incentive-compatible direct mecha-
nisms. A direct mechanism for bargaining games is characterized by two functions: (1) a probability
distribution σ : V1×V2 → [0, 1] that specifies the probability that the object is transferred from the
seller to the buyer and (2) a monetary transfer scheme p : V1 × V2 → R2. In this setting, ex-post
efficiency is achieved if σ(v1, v2) = 1 when v1 < v2, and 0 otherwise.
Our result consists in showing that a mechanismM′ for the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting can
be constructed using a mechanism M for a one-way game in such a way that, if M is efficient,
individual-rational (IR), incentive compatible (IC), and budget-balanced (BB), thenM′ is efficient,
IR, IC, and BB. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states that such a mechanism
M′ cannot exist, which implies the following impossibility result for one-way games.
Theorem 1. There is no ex-post efficient, individually rational, incentive-compatible, and budget-
balanced mechanism for one-way games.
Proof. For any bargaining setting, consider the following transformation into a one-way game in-
stance:
SA = {s1A, s2A},SB = {sB},
∀v1 ∈ V1 : uA(s1A, v1) = v1, uA(s2A, v1) = 0,
∀v2 ∈ V2 : uB((s1A, sB), v2) = 0, uB((s2A, sB), v2) = v2,
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where player types (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2 are drawn from distribution f1 × f2. Two possible outcomes
may occur, (s1A, sB) or (s
2
A, sB), with social welfare v1 and v2 respectively.
Let us assume M = (k, t) is a direct mechanism for one-way games and that M is ex-post
efficient, IR, IC, and BB. We now construct a mechanism M′ = (σ, p), where σ(v1, v2) is the
probability that the object is transferred from the seller to the buyer and p(v1, v2) is the payment
of each player. We define M′ such that
σ(v1, v2) =
{
0 if k(v1, v2) = (s
1
A, sB),
1 if k(v1, v2) = (s
2
A, sB),
and
p(v1, v2) = t(v1, v2).
It remains to show that M′ satisfies all the desired properties. An ex-post efficient mechanism
M in the one-way instance satisfies
k(v1, v2) =
{
(s1A, sB) if v1 ≥ v2,
(s2A, sB) if v1 < v2.
Therefore, σ(v1, v2) will assign the object to the buyer iff v1 < v2. That is, the player with the
highest valuation will always get the object, meeting the restriction of ex-post efficiency. The
budget-balanced constraint inM implies that p1(v1, v2)+ p2(v1, v2) = 0 for all possible valuations,
so M′ is budget-balanced.
The individual rationality property for M′ comes from noticing that the default strategy of
player A when no payments are allowed is s1A and the corresponding payoff is v1. Therefore, the
seller utility is guaranteed to be at least her valuation v1. Analogously, the buyer will not have a
negative utility given that uB((s
1
A, sB), v2) = 0.
Incentive-compatibility is straightforward from definition. Assume that M′ is not incentive-
compatible, then in mechanism M, at least one player could benefit from reporting a false type.
Such a mechanism M′ cannot exist since it contradicts Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility
result, which concludes our proof.
An immediate consequence of this result is that Bayesian-Nash mechanisms can only achieve
at most two of the three properties: ex-post efficiency, individual-rationality, and budget balance.
For instance, VCG and dAGVA [d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1979; Arrow, 1979] are part of
the Groves family of mechanisms that truthfully implement social choice functions that are ex-post
efficient. VCG has no guarantee of budget balance, while dAGVA is not guaranteed to meet the
individual-rationality constraints. We refer the reader to Williams (1999) and Krishna and Perry
(1998) for alternative derivations of the impossibility result for bilateral trading under the Groves
family of mechanisms.
5 Single-Offer Mechanism
In this section, we propose a simple bargaining mechanism for player B to increase her payoff. The
literature about bargaining games is extensive and we refer readers to a broad review by Kennan
and Wilson (1993).
Given the nature of our applications, individual rationality imposes a necessary constraint. Oth-
erwise, player A can always defect from participating in the mechanism and achieve her maximal
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payoff independently of the type of player B. Additionally, we search for Bayesian-Nash mecha-
nisms without subsidies, i.e., budget-balanced mechanisms. The lack of a subsidiary in this case
gives rise to a decentralized mechanism that does not require a third agent to perform the compu-
tations needed by the mechanism. However, a third party is needed to ensure compliance with the
agreement reached by both players.
An interesting starting point for one-way games is the recognition that, whenever player B has
a better payoff than A, player A may let player B play her optimal strategy in exchange for money.
The resulting outcome can be viewed as swapping the roles of both players, i.e., player B chooses
her optimal strategy and A plays her best response to B’s strategy. In this case, as in Proposition
1, the worst outcome would be
1 +
maxs∈S uA(s, θA)
maxs∈S uB(s, θB)
.
This observation leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider the social choice function that selects the best strategy that maximizes the
payoff of either player A or player B, i.e., the strategy
s′(θ) = arg-max
s∈S
(max (uA(s, θA), uB(s, θB))) .
In the one-way game, strategy s′(θ) has a price of anarchy of 2 (i.e., ∀θ PoA(θ) = 2).
Unfortunately, this social choice function cannot be implemented in dominant strategies without
violating individual rationality. Player A may have a smaller payoff by following strategy s′ instead
of the Nash equilibrium strategy sN . Indeed, when SW (s′, θ) < SW (sN , θ), it must be that at least
one of the players will be worse than playing the Nash equilibrium strategy sN . Lemma 2 however
gives us hope for designing a budget-balanced mechanism that has a constant price of anarchy.
Indeed, a simple and distributed implementation would ask player B to propose an action to be
implemented and player A would receive a monetary compensation for deviating from her maximal
strategy.
We now present such a distributed implementation based on a bargaining mechanism. The
mechanism is inspired by the model of two-person bargaining under incomplete information pre-
sented by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). In their model, both the seller and the buyer submit
sealed offers and a trade occurs if there is a gap in the bids. The price is then set to be a convex
combination of the bids. Our single-offer mechanism adapts this idea to one-way games. In par-
ticular, to counteract player A’s advantage, player B makes the first and final offer. Moreover, the
structure of our mechanism makes it possible to quantify the price of anarchy and provide quality
guarantee on the mechanism outcome. Our single-offer mechanism is defined as follows:
1. Player B selects an action sA ∈ SA to propose to player A.
2. Player B also computes her outside option sOB(sA, θB) in case player A rejects action sA, and
we denote by uOB(sA, θB) the expected payoff from her outside option.
3. Player B proposes a monetary value of γ ·∆B(sA, θB) with ∆B(sA, θB) = uB(sB(sA, θB), θB)−
uOB(sA, θB) and γ ∈ R[0,1] to player A in the hope that she accepts to play strategy sA instead
of strategy sNA .
4. Player A decides whether to accept the offer.
5. If player A accepts the offer, the outcome of the game is (sA, sB(sA, θB)). Otherwise the
outcome of the game is the outside option
(
sNA (θA), s
O
B(sA, θB)
)
.
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It is worth observing that a broker is required in this mechanism to ensure that the outcome(
sNA (θA), s
O
B(sA, θB)
)
is implemented if player A rejects the unique offer, and no counteroffers are
made. A key feature of the single-offer mechanism is that it requires a minimum amount of infor-
mation from player A (i.e., whether she accepts or rejects the offer).
To derive the equilibrium strategy for the single-offer mechanism, we assume players are ex-
pected utility maximizers. The parameter γ ∈ R[0,1] has been chosen so that player B, satisfying
individual rationality, never offers more than ∆B(sA, θB) and her payoff is never worse than her
expected outside option uOB(sA, θB). Whereas the mechanism can only guarantee interim individ-
ual rationality for player B, it provides ex-post individual rationality for player A, as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. If players A and B play the single-offer mechanism, for any (θA, θB) ∈ Θ, player
A accepts the offer (γ, sA) whenever
uA(sA, θA) + γ ·∆B(sA, θB) ≥ uA(sNA (θA), θA).
In case player A rejects the offer (γ, sA), she will choose her utility maximizing action s
N
A (θA)
as her outside option. Note that by Proposition 2, if sA = s
N
A (θA), player A would never reject
the proposed action sA. Accordingly, if proposed action sA is rejected then sA 6= sNA (θA). This
observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For every task s ∈ SA, let ΘsA = ΘA \ {θA ∈ ΘA : s = arg-maxx∈SA uA(x, θA)}.
In the single-offer mechanism, player B will pick outside option sOB(sA, θB) such that her expected
payoff is maximized, i.e.,
sOB(sA, θB) = arg-max
sB∈SB
Eθ
sA
A
[
uB
(
(sNA (θA), sB), θB
)]
.
Example 1. (continued) The payoff of Player B is higher if action s1A is played by player A. Hence,
player B has incentives to submit an offer c that triggers action s1A. Player A accepts the offer
if c + uA(s
1
A) ≥ uA(s2A) = 100. Given that uA(s1A) follows a uniform distribution, the probability
that player A accepts the offer is c100 if c ≤ 100 and 1 otherwise. For player B, this offer has an
expected payoff of c100 · (x− c) if c ≤ 100 and x − c otherwise. The optimal value for the offer is
given by c∗ = x2 if x ≤ 200 and c∗ = 100 if x > 200. This leads to an expected social welfare for
the single-offer mechanism of
SW =
{
100 + x
(
x
200 − 14
)
if x ≤ 200,
50 + x if x > 200
Recall that the optimal social welfare is 50 + x if x ≥ 50 and 100 otherwise. Therefore, the
mechanism has a price of anarchy,
PoA =


100
100+x( x200−
1
4)
if x ≤ 50,
50+x
100+x( x200−
1
4)
if 50 ≤ x ≤ 200,
50+x
50+x if 200 ≤ x.
The PoA is bounded by a constant and in fact, PoA ≤ 1.21 for any x. This contrasts with the
unbounded PoA obtained when no side payments are allowed.
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Example 2. (continued) The payoff of player B is higher if action s1A is played by player A. Hence,
player B has an incentive to submit a monetary offer c ≤ 1 that triggers action s1A. Player A accepts
the offer if c + uA(s
1
A) ≥ maxsA∈SA uA(sA). It can be shown that the probability that player A
accepts the offer is cn−c
n
n−1 . In case of acceptance, the expected payoff is µ1 − c for player B and
1
2 + c for player A. In case of rejection, it is guaranteed that player A will not play s
1
A and hence
player B’s outside option is action sB(s
2
A, θB) with an expected payoff of
µ2
n−1 . Player A’s expected
outside option is n
n+1 , corresponding to her expected maximum payoff derived in Example 2. As a
result, player B by offering c, has an expected payoff of
cn− cn
n− 1 (µ1 − c) +
(
1− cn− c
n
n− 1
)
µ2
n+ 1
.
When n is large, the probability of acceptance is approximately,
lim
n→∞
cn− cn
n− 1 = c.
Accordingly, in case of rejection, the expected payoffs become limn→∞
µ2
n−1 = 0 for player B, and
limn→∞
n
n+1 = 1 for player A. Player B’s expected payoff is thus c (µ1 − c) and is maximized when
she offers c∗ = µ12 if µ1 ≤ 2 and c∗ = 1 otherwise. This leads to an expected social welfare for the
single-offer mechanism of SW = c∗(µ1+
1
2)+ (1− c∗)(0+ 1). Recall that the optimal social welfare
is 12 + µ1 if µ1 ≥ 12 and 1 otherwise. Therefore the mechanism has the following price of anarchy,
PoA =


1
µ1
2 (µ1 +
1
2) + (1− µ12 )
if µ1 ≤ 12 ,
1
2 + µ1
µ1
2 (µ1 +
1
2) + (1− µ12 )
if 12 ≤ µ1 ≤ 2,
1
2 + µ1
1
2 + µ1
= 1 if 2 ≤ µ1,
and the PoA has a maximum value of 431
(
3 + 2
√
10
) ≈ 1.203. This contrasts with the unbounded
PoA obtained by the Nash equilibrium when no side payments are allowed.
We now generalize the analysis done in Examples 1 and 2. We proceed by studying the utility-
maximizing strategy (sA, γ) for player B and then derive the expected social welfare of the outcome
for the single-offer mechanism. Note that, in case of agreement, the action of player B of type θB
is solely defined by sA as she has no incentives to defect from its best response sB(sA, θB). By
Proposition 2, player A accepts an offer whenever ∆A(sA, θA) ≤ γ∆B(sA, θB), where ∆A(sA, θA) =
uA(s
N
A (θA), θA)−uA(sA, θA). Player B obviously aims at choosing γ and sA to maximize her payoff
and we now study this optimization problem. In the case of an agreement, player B is left with a
profit of
uB(sB(sA, θB), θB)− γ ·∆B(sA, θB).
Otherwise, player B gets an expected payoff of uOB(sA, θB).
Definition 8. The probability that player A accepts the offer (sA, γ), given that player B has type
θB ∈ ΘB, is
P (sA, γ, θB) = Pr [γ ·∆B(sA, θB) ≥ ∆A(sA, θA)] =
∫
θA∈ΘA
fA(θA) · δ(sA, γ ·∆B(sA, θB), θA)dθA,
with
δ(sA, x, θA) =
{
1 if x ≥ ∆A(sA, θA),
0 otherwise.
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The expected profit of players A and B for proposed action s = (sA, sB) and γ when player B has
type θB is given by
EθA [UB(sA, γ, θB)] = u
O
B(sA, θB) + P (sA, γ, θB) ((1− γ) ·∆B(sA, θB)) ,
EθA [UA(sA, γ, θB)] = EθA [u
N
A (θA)] + P (sA, γ, θB) · (γ ·∆B(sA, θB)− EθA [∆A(sA, θA)]) .
The optimal strategy of player B is specified in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. On the single-offer mechanism, player B chooses s∗A(θB) and γ
∗(s∗A, θB) such that
s∗A(θB) = arg-max
sA∈SA
EθA [UB(sA, γ
∗, θB)] ,
where
γ∗(sA, θB) = arg-max
γ∈R[0,1]
P (sA, γ, θB) · (1− γ).
5.1 Price of Anarchy
We now analyze the quality of the outcomes in the single-offer mechanism. The first step is the
derivation of a lower bound for the expected social welfare of the single-offer mechanism. Inspired
by Lemma 2, instead of considering all pairs 〈sA, γ〉, the analysis restricts attention to a single
action s′A = arg-maxsA∈SA uB(sB(sA, θB), θB). We prove that, when offering to player A action
s′A and its associated optimal value for γ, the expected social welfare is lower than the optimal
pair 〈s∗A, γ∗〉. As a result, we obtain an upper bound to the price of anarchy of the single-offer
mechanism.
To make the discussion precise, consider the strategy where player B offers 〈s′A, γ∗(s′A, θB)〉,
with γ∗(s′A, θB) being the optimal choice of γ given s
′
A, following the notation used in Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. For any type θB ∈ ΘB of player B, the expected social welfare achieved by the single-
offer mechanism is at least the expected social welfare achieved by the strategy 〈s′A, γ∗(s′A, θB)〉.
Proof. Let γ∗ = γ∗(s∗A, θB) and γ
′ = γ∗(s′A, θB). The optimality condition of s
∗ implies that
EθA
[
UB(s
′, γ′, θB)
] ≤ EθA [UB(s∗, γ∗, θB)] . (1)
Two cases can occur. The first case is
P (s′A, γ
′, θB) ≤ P (s∗A, γ∗, θB),
i.e., the probability of player A accepting offer (s∗A, γ
∗) is greater than if offered (s′A, γ
′). Then, it
must be that the expected payoff of player A is greater when offered (s∗A, γ
∗), i.e.,
EθA
[
UA(s
′
A, γ
′, θB)
] ≤ EθA [UA(s∗A, γ∗, θB)] .
This, together with Inequality (1) results in the single-offer mechanism having a greater expected
social welfare.
The second case is
P (s′A, γ
′, θB) > P (s
∗
A, γ
∗, θB).
Consider γ′′ such that P (s′A, γ
′′, θB) = P (s
∗
A, γ
∗, θB). The fact that the probabilities of accep-
tance are the same implies that the expected payoff of Player A is the same in both cases, i.e.,
EθA [UA(s
′
A, γ
′′, θB)] = EθA [UA(s
∗
A, γ
∗, θB)]. This, together with Equation (1) yields
EθA [SW (s
∗, γ∗, θB)] ≥ EθA[SW (s′, γ′′, θB)].
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This is equivalent to
uB(s
∗, θB) + EθA [uA(s
∗
A, θA)] ≥ uB(s′, θB) + EθA [uA(s′A, θA)]. (2)
Similarly, consider γ∗∗ such that
P (s′A, γ
′, θB) = P (s
∗
A, γ
∗∗, θB),
which implies
EθA
[
UA(s
′
A, γ
′, θB)
]
= EθA [UA(s
∗
A, γ
∗∗, θB)] .
Existence of γ∗∗ is guaranteed by Inequality (2) which states that, there is more money in expec-
tation to transfer to player A when choosing s∗ over s′. The fact that the acceptance probabilities
are the same, together with Inequality (2), implies that
EθA [SW (s
∗, γ∗∗, θB)] ≥ EθA [SW (s′, γ′, θB)].
Given that the expected payoff of player A is the same in both cases, it must be the case that the
expected payoff of player B is higher when using (s∗A, γ
∗∗).
Therefore, we have found an offer for the single-offer mechanism with greater expected social
welfare and a greater payoff for player B compared with strategy 〈s′A, γ′〉.
We are ready to derive an upper bound for the induced price of anarchy for the single-offer mecha-
nism. We first derive the price of anarchy of strategy 〈s′A, γ′〉 in case of agreement and disagreement
of player A.
Lemma 5. Consider action s′ = argmaxs∈S uB(s, θB) and let PoA
A(γ) and PoAR(γ) denote the
induced price of anarchy if player A accepts and rejects the offer given a proposed γ. Then,
PoAA(γ) = 1 + γ and PoAR(γ) = 1 +
1
γ
.
Proof. Let sNA = s
N
A (θA), u
N
A = uA(s
N
A , θA), u
′
A = uA(s
′, θA), u
′
B = uB(s
′, θB), s
O
B = s
O
B(s
′
A, θA) and
uOB = u
O
B(s
′
A, θB). Player B offers action s
′
A and a monetary value of γ∆B(s
′
A) = γ(u
′
B − uOB) to
player A. Two cases can occur.
Player A accepts: u′A + γ∆B(s
′
A) ≥ uNA . Strategy (s′A, s′B) is played.
PoAA ≤ u
N
A + u
′
B
u′A + u
′
B
≤ u
′
A + u
′
B + γ · u′B
u′A + u
′
B
= 1 + γ
u′B
u′A + u
′
B
≤ 1 + γ.
Player A rejects: u′A + γ∆B(s
′
A) < u
N
A . Strategy (s
N
A , s
O
B) is played.
PoAR ≤ u
N
A + u
′
B
uNA + u
O
B
≤ 1 + u
′
B
uNA + u
O
B
≤ 1 + 1
γ
,
where the last inequality comes from
u′A + γ∆B(s
′
A) < u
N
A ⇔ γu′B < uNA + γuOB − u′A < uNA + uOB.
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When γ = 1, the price of anarchy is 2 but player B has no incentive to choose such a value.
If γ = 0.5, the price of anarchy is 3. Of course, player B will choose γ′ = γ∗(s′A, θB). Lemma
5 indicates that the worst-case outcome is (1 + γ′) when player A accepts with a probability
P (s′A, γ
′, θB) and (1 +
1
γ′
) otherwise. This yields the following result.
Theorem 6. The Bayesian price of anarchy of the single-offer mechanism for one-way games is
at most
γ′ + 1
γ′
(
1− P (s′A, γ′, θB)(1 − γ′)
)
,
where
γ′ = arg-max
γ∈R[0,1]
P (s′A, γ, θB)(1− γ).
Proof. By combining Lemmas 4 and 5, we can derive the following upper bound for the PoA.
PoA ≤ P (s′A, γ′, θB)PoAA(γ′) +
(
1− P (s′A, γ′, θB)
)
PoAR(γ′)
= P (s′A, γ
′, θB)
(
1 + γ′
)
+
(
1− P (s′A, γ′, θB)
)(
1 +
1
γ′
)
= 1 +
1
γ′
+ P (s′A, γ
′, θB)
(
γ′ − 1
γ′
)
=
γ′ + 1
γ′
+ P (s′A, γ
′, θB)
(
γ′2 − 1
γ′
)
=
γ′ + 1
γ′
(
1− P (s′A, γ′, θB)
(
1− γ′))
To get a better idea of how the mechanism improves the social welfare, it is useful to quantify the
price of anarchy in Theorem 6 for a specific class of distributions.
Corollary 7. If ∆A(s
′
A, θA) has a cumulative distribution function F (x) = (x/∆B)
β between 0 and
∆B, with 0 < β ≤ 1, then γ = ββ+1 and the price of anarchy is at most
(2 +
1
β
)(1− ββ(1 + β)−(β+1)).
For example, if β = 1, then F (x) is the uniform distribution, γ = 12 , and the expected price of
anarchy is at most 2.25.
This corollary, in conjunction with Lemma 2, gives us the cost of enforcing individual rationality,
moving from a price of anarchy of 2 to a price of 2.25 in the case of a uniform distribution.
The strategy 〈s′A, γ′〉 is of independent interest. It indicates how a player with limited compu-
tational power can achieve an outcome that satisfies individual rationality without optimizing over
all strategies.
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6 Multi-Offer Mechanism
This section extends the single-offer mechanism by allowing player B to make multiple monetary
offers for the same proposed action. Our main result shows that making counteroffers under com-
mitment does not improve efficiency over the single-offer mechanism. By commitment we mean
that player B must be able to guarantee that the price schedule she originally announces will not
be modified in the future.
The single-offer mechanism was characterized by a an action sA ∈ SA and a single value γ ∈
R[0,1]. The multi-offer mechanism is characterized by a 4-tuple
(sA ∈ SA, n, γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Rn[0,1], p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn[0,1]),
where n is the number of offers, (γ1, . . . , γn) is a sequence of numbers in R
n
[0,1] to compute the ratios
of ∆B(sA, θB) = uB(sB(sA, θB), θB) − uOB(sA, θB) to be offered, and (p1, . . . , pn) is a sequence of
probabilities for continuing to make offers where we assume that p1 = 1. The multi-offer mechanism
is defined as follows:
1. Player B selects an action sA ∈ SA to propose to player A.
2. Player B also computes her outside option sOB(sA, θB) in case player A rejects action sA, and
we denote by uOB(sA, θB) the expected payoff from her outside option.
3. Player B selects γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Rn[0,1] and p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn[0,1] , with p1 = 1. Player B
has to commit to this sequence of values (in spite of what she learns from player A’s actions).
4. At step 1 ≤ i ≤ n, player B proposes a monetary value of γi ·∆B(sA, θB) with ∆B(sA, θB) =
uB(sB(sA, θB), θB) − uOB(sA, θB) and γi ∈ R[0,1] to player A in the hope that she accepts to
play strategy sA instead of strategy s
N
A .
5. Player A decides whether to accept the offer.
6. If player A accepts the offer, the outcome of the game is (sA, sB(sA, θB)).
7. If player A rejects the offer, set i← i+ 1 and go to step 4 with probability pi.
8. Otherwise the outcome of the game is the outside option
(
sNA (θA), s
O
B(sA, θB)
)
.
For ease of notation, we denote ∆B(sA) = ∆B(sA, θB) and ∆A(sA) = ∆A(sA, θA) for the rest
of this section, where ∆A(sA, θA) = uA(s
N
A (θA), θA)−uA(sA, θA). In the multiple-offer mechanism,
player B makes a sequence of offers γi∆B(sA) to player A to play strategy sA. The first offer
is γ1∆B(sA). If player A refuses the offer, then player B makes a second offer γ2∆B(sA) with
probability p2. Hence, with probability 1 − p2, player B makes no offer and the outcome of the
game is
(
sNA (θA), s
O
B(sA, θB)
)
. In general, at iteration i, player B makes an offer γi∆B(sA) with
probability pi and the outside option is played with probability 1− pi. The mechanism stops when
player A accepts an offer or when Player B stops making offers to player A. In this last case, once
again, the outside option is played.
Observe that player A could reject an offer even if it is more profitable than playing her max-
imizing utility action sNA (θA) because she may expect a better offer in the future. To avoid this
behavior, the multi-offer mechanism imposes a condition on the γi’s and pi’s to ensure that player A
accepts the first offer that gives her a higher payoff than her default action sNA (θA). Two conditions
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must hold for player A to accept an offer in step i ∈ [1, . . . , n]:
(a) Individual Rationality:
γi∆B(sA) ≥ ∆A(sA), (3)
which is equivalent to Proposition 2.
(b) Greater expected utility in step i than in step i+ 1:
γi∆B(sA) + uA(sA, θA) ≥ pi+1 (γi+1∆B(sA) + uA(sA, θA)) + (1− pi+1)uA(sNA (θA), θA)
which is equivalent to
γi − pi+1γi+1
1− pi+1 ∆B(sA) ≥ ∆A(sA). (4)
We now show that the multiple-offer mechanism is in fact equivalent to the single-offer mechanism.
We use the notation
Si =


0 i = 0,
γi−pi+1γi+1
1−pi+1
n > i > 0,
γn i = n.
so that Condition (4) can be expressed as Si∆B(sA) ≥ ∆A(sA).
Note that if player A refuses an offer with γi, she will also refuse offers with smaller ratios. This
observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the multi-offer mechanism,
γi+1 > γi, ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n − 1].
Therefore, Proposition 4 states that counteroffers should be increasing on time.
Lemma 8. In the multiple-offer mechanism, for all i ∈ [1, . . . , n],
γi ≥ Si.
Proof. Assume that γi < Si. By definition of Si, it follows that γi − pi+1γi < γi − pi+1γi+1 and
hence γi > γi+1. This contradicts Proposition 4, stating that the γ’s are defined as a non-decreasing
sequence.
Corollary 9. Condition (4) implies Condition (3).
Proof. Si ≤ γi and ∆A(sA) ≤ Si∆B(sA) implies ∆A(sA) ≤ Si∆B(sA) ≤ γi∆B(sA).
If player A rejected the offer in step i − 1, then Conditions (3) and (4) were both not satisfied in
step i− 1. By Lemma 8, only two cases may occur:
1. If γi∆B(sA) < ∆A(sA) then it must be the case that
Si−1∆B(sA) ≤ γi−1∆B(sA) < ∆A(sA). (5)
2. If γi∆B(sA) ≥ ∆A(sA) then
Si−1∆B(sA) < ∆A(sA) ≤ γi−1∆B(sA). (6)
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The disjunction of Conditions (5) and (6) yields the following inequality
Si−1∆B(sA) < ∆A(sA). (7)
By Corollary 9, if player A accepts in step i given that she rejected in step i− 1, we have that
∆A(sA) ≤ Si∆B(sA). (8)
Recalling Definition 8, the cumulative distribution function of random variable ∆A(sA) was denoted
by,
P (sA, γ) = Pr [∆A(sA) ≤ γ∆B(sA)] .
Hence the probability of acceptance in step i can be derived from Conditions (7) and (8) as
Pr[Si−1∆B(sA) < ∆A(sA) ≤ Si∆B(sA)] = P (sA, Si)− P (sA, Si−1).
Player B aims at choosing the γi’s, the probabilities pi’s and action sA to maximize her expected
utility, which is equivalent to the following optimization problem.
max
γ,p
n∑
i=1



 i∏
j=1
pj

 (P (sA, Si)− P (sA, Si−1))) (1− γi)

 (9)
s.t. p1 = 1, (10)
S0 = 0, (11)
Si =
γi − pi+1γi+1
1− pi+1 , (12)
Sn = γn, (13)
S1 ≤ S2 ≤ . . . ≤ Sn ≤ 1. (14)
Where the term
∏i
j=1 pj is the probability of reaching to the i-th offer. We are now ready to state
the main result of this section.
Theorem 10. The multi-offer mechanism is equivalent to the single-offer mechanism in one-way
games.
Proof. By Equation (12),
(1− pi+1)(1 − Si) = (1− γi)− pi+1(1− γi+1).
Then, by using (13) and grouping the P (sA, Si) terms, the objective function becomes
n−1∑
i=1



 i∏
j=1
pj

 (1− pi+1)P (sA, Si)(1 − Si)

+

 n∏
j=1
pj

P (sA, γn)(1 − γn). (15)
Observe that each term in the objective function features an expression of the form P (sA, x)(1−x).
Hence the objective is bounded by above by
(15) ≤
n−1∑
i=1



 i∏
j=1
pj

 (1− pi+1) · C

+C · n∏
j=1
pj
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where C = maxx P (sA, x)(1 − x). We show that, for any given probabilities p, there is a unique
solution that meets this upper bound. Let x∗ = argmaxx P (sA, x). The right-hand term in (15)
is optimized by setting γn = x
∗. We show by induction that all the other terms are optimized by
setting γi = x
∗. Assume that this holds for γi+1, . . . , γn. We need to optimize P (sA, Si)(1 − Si).
By induction,
Si =
γi − pi+1x∗
1− pi+1
and assigning x∗ to γi gives Si = x
∗ and P (sA, Si)(1−Si) = C. Since all γi are equal, this concludes
the proof.
The above derivation is related to a well-known result from Sobel and Takahashi (1983), which
models an iterative bargaining where there is a buyer with a private reservation price and a seller
with reservation price 0 who makes all the offers. There is a known fixed discount factor for each
player and, when these discount factors are equal (this is equivalent to have a probability for a
next offer), they showed that, under commitment, the infinite horizon bargaining is equivalent to
the single shot. There are differences between their model and ours: In our model, the buyer is
making the offers, the probabilities are not fixed a priori (Player B can choose them), and both
outside options are private.
7 Discussion
In one-way games, the utility of one player does not depend on the decisions of the other player. We
showed that, in this setting, the outcome of a Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily far from the social
welfare solution. We also proved that it is impossible to design a Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible
mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. To
alleviate these negative results, we proposed two privacy-preserving mechanisms: a single-offer and
a multi-offer mechanism and showed that both are equivalent.
The single-offer mechanism is simple for both parties, as well as for the broker who just makes
sure that the players follow the protocol. This mechanism also requires minimal information from
the agents who perform all the combinatorial computations, while it incentivizes them to cooperate
towards the social welfare in a distributed setting. Moreover, the mechanism has the following
desirable properties: it is budget-balanced and satisfies the individual rationality constraints and
Bayesian incentive-compatibility conditions. Additionally, we showed that, in a realistic setting,
where agents have limited computational resources, a simpler version of the mechanism can be
implemented without overly deteriorating the social welfare.
It is an open question whether there exists another mechanism (possibly more complex) that
could lead to a better efficiency, while keeping the above properties. Indeed, in one-way games,
player A has a intrinsic advantage over player B, which is not easy to overcome. One possible
promising mechanism consists of player B setting rewards for all player A’s actions, and player
A choosing one in return for that money. This is known as the Bayesian Unit-demand Item-
Pricing Problem (BUPP) [Chawla et al., 2007]. Recent work has shown this problem to be NP-
hard [Chen et al., 2014], but a factor 3 approximation to the optimal expected revenue of player
B is obtained in [Chawla et al., 2007] (subsequently improved to 2 in [Chawla et al., 2010]). In
the context of our paper, several interesting questions arise from the Bayesian Unit-demand Item-
Pricing Problem. What is the efficiency achieved by the BUPP in one-way games? What is the
impact of a constant factor approximation for the revenue on the social welfare in one-way games?
There are also many other directions for future research. It is important to generalize one-way
games to multiple players. Moreover, there are applications where the dependencies are in both
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directions, e.g., the restoration of the power and the gas systems considered in Coffrin et al. (2012).
These applications typically have multiple components to restore and the dependencies form an
acyclic graph. Hence such a mechanism would likely need to consider this internal structure to
obtain efficient outcomes.
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